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ABSTRACT 
The one-side defaultable financial derivatives valuation problems have been studied 
extensively, but the valuation of bilateral derivatives with asymmetric credit qualities 
is still lacking convincing mechanism. This paper presents an analytical model for 
valuing derivatives subject to default by both counterparties. The default-free 
interest rates are modeled by the Market Models, while the default time is modeled 
by the reduced-form model as the first jump of a time-inhomogeneous Poisson 
process. All quantities modeled are market-observable. The closed-form solution 
gives us a better understanding of the impact of the credit asymmetry on swap 
value, credit value adjustment, swap rate and swap spread. 
 
 
Key words: defaultable interest rate swap, bilateral defaultable claim, credit 
asymmetry, market models, Black model, LIBOR market model, reduced-form 
model, credit value adjustment, swap spread. 
 
                                   
1 Email: tim_yxiao@yahoo.com  Url: https://finpricing.com/ 
 
1. Introduction 
Interest rate swap (IRS) is one of the most popular financial derivatives. In 
the market, IRS’s are quoted irrespective of credit ratings of counterparties. In 
another words, they are considered as default-free. The valuation of default-free 
IRS’s under a term structure of interest rates is a classical exercise. However, swap 
contracts are traded over-the-counter (OTC) and are not backed by the guarantee of 
a clearing corporation or an exchange. As a consequence, each party is exposed to 
the credit risk (default risk). Historical experience shows that credit risk often leads 
to significant losses. Therefore, one should incorporate the cost of the counterparty 
risk into the swap price. Also, regulatory issues related to the Basel II framework 
encourage the inclusion of default risk into valuation. 
Pricing defaultable derivatives or pricing the counterparty credit risk is a 
relatively new area of derivatives modeling and trading. Credit value adjustment 
(CVA) allows us to quantify counterparty credit risk as a single, measurable Profit & 
Loss number. By definition, CVA is the difference between the risk-free trade value 
and the true (or risky or defaultable) trade value that takes into account the 
possibility of counterparty’s default. Commonly, the CVA is not paid as a lump-sum 
upfront premium, but rather is structured into a funding spread. The risk-free trade 
value is what brokers quote or what trading systems or models normally report. The 
defaultable trade value, however, is a relatively less explored and less transparent 
area, which is the main challenge and core theme for credit risk adjustment. 
IRS is a typical bilateral contingent contract that can be either an asset or a 
liability to each party during the life of the contract. Unlike the unilateral defaultable 
claim valuation problems that have been studied extensively by many authors, the 
valuation of bilateral contingent claims is still lacking convincing mechanism. The 
problem is mainly caused by the asymmetric credit qualities and the asymmetric 
default settlement rules. 
Sundaresan (1991), Longstaff and Schwartz (1993), and Tang and Li (2007) 
simplify the problem by considering the IRS as a simple exchange of loans 
(receivable parts and payable parts). It is inappropriate to value a defaultable IRS by 
pricing the default risk of the promised gross payment from each party separately 
and then adding the two together. Because the promised cash flow exchange in an 
IRS is always netted. Another simplification consists of taking into account the 
presence of one risky counterparty only, as in Li (1998) and Arvanities and Gregory 
(2001). These approaches overlook the presence of bilateral default risk. 
The first study on asymmetric defaultable IRS is conducted by Duffie and 
Huang (1996). They use a short rate interest rate model combined with a reduced-
form default model and lead to numerical approximations by solving a recursive 
integral. Even the authors admit that it is a substantial complexity solution. Hubner 
(2001) extends the work carried out by Duffie and Huang (1996) and gets a closed-
form solution by introducing a one-dimensional state variable X that can be thought 
of as a ratio of the market value of the firm’s assets. The author, however, does not 
show how to calibrate the state variable and not even provide a simple example. In 
general, these proposed models are not practical enough to use. 
In this paper, we present an analytical model for valuing contingent claims 
subject to default by both parties. While the general principles of the valuation model 
can be applied to other bilateral defaultable contingent claims, we focus on the 
valuation of defaultable IRS’s in which both parties are exposed to credit risk. The 
approach is based on market models for interest rates and a reduced-form model for 
the default time. All quantities modeled are market-observable. With the closed-form 
solution, we can analyze the impact of credit risk on swap value, swap rate, swap 
spread and CVA more closely. We confirm the results in Duffie and Huang (1996) 
and also report some new findings. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Market models are discussed in 
Section 2. In section 3, the valuation of asymmetric defaultable IRS and CVA are 
elaborated. The results are presented in Section 4. The conclusions are given in 
Section 5. 
 
2. Market Models 
Consider an increasing maturity structure NTTT  ...0 10  from which 
expiry-maturity pairs of dates ( 1kT , kT ) for a family of spanning forward rates are 
taken. The simply compounded forward rate reset at t for forward period ( 1kT , kT ) is 
defined by 
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where ),( TtP  denotes the time t price of a zero-coupon bond maturing at time T and 
),(: 1 kkk TT   is the accrual factor or day count fraction for period ( 1kT , kT ). 
Consider a zero coupon bond numeraire ),( iTP   whose maturity coincides 
with the maturity of the forward rate iF . The measure 
iQ  associated with ),( iTP   is 
called iT  forward measure. 
The name ‘market model’ refers to the modeling of market observable 
variables such as forward rates and swap rates. The explicit modeling market rates 
allows for natural formulas for interest rate option volatility, that are consistent with 
the market practice of using the formula of Black for caps and swaptions. The typical 
market models are Black model, LIBOR market model (LMM) and swap market model 
(SMM). 
The Black model is a variant of the Black-Scholes option pricing model and 
consists of a series of forward measures. Each forward rate is modeled by a 
lognormal process under its own forward measure. The forward rate dynamics under 
the Black model is 
 )()()( tdWtFtdF kkkk      (2) 
where k  is the Black caplet volatility or the spot volatility of the forward rate kF ; 
)(tWk  is a Brownian motion 
The solution to equation (2) can be expressed as 
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The LMM, in contrast to the Black model, describes the dynamic of a whole 
family of forward rates under a common measure. 
Under the lognormal assumption and the forward measure 
iQ , the forward 
rate )(tFk  of LMM follows the following dynamics: 
Case 1.       i < k, iTt  :  
)()()(
)(1
)()(
)()()(
1
tdWtFtv
dt
tF
tFtv
tFtvtdF
kkk
k
ij jj
jjjkj
kkk


 
 

 (4) 
Case 2.  i = k, 1 kTt   )()()()( tdWtFttdF kkkk     (5) 
Case 3.  i > k, 1 kTt           
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where )(tk  is the instantaneous volatility. We further assume that the Brownian 
motions )(tWk  and )(tW j  of different forward rates )(tFk  and )(tF j  are 
instantaneously correlated according to kj , i.e., 
   dttdWtdW kjjk )()(     (7) 
For a vanilla instrument like swap or cap, the payoff can be decomposed 
additively into a sum of sub-payoffs (each is involved with a single forward rate and 
associated with a contract called swaplet or caplet). We can evaluate each sub-
payoff separately and sum corresponding results together. For each sub-payoff, the 
joint dynamics of forward rates is not involved. As a consequence, the correlation 
between different rates does not afflict the sub-payoff, since marginal distribution of 
the single forward rate is enough to compute the expectation appearing in the sub-
payoff. In other words, the correlations between different forward rates are not 
relevant to these kinds of vanilla products. As matter of fact, the valuations for these 
vanilla products under either the LMM or the Black model should be equivalent; 
otherwise it will violate the fundamental single value rule and create an arbitrage 
opportunity (see Proposition 6.4.1 of Brigo-Mercurio (2006)). 
 
3. Swap Valuation and CVA 
We consider a filtered probability space (  , F, P) with a filtration F t  
satisfying the usual conditions, where   denotes a sample space; F denotes a  -
algebra; P denotes a probability measure. Let valuation date be t. Consider a fixed-
for-floating swap. Two counterparties are denoted as A and B. Counterparty A pays a 
fixed rate, while counterparty B pays a floating-rate.  
Assume the IRS has the first reset date 0T  and payment dates 1T ,…, nT . 
There are total n future cash flows iX . From the perspective of counterparty A, The 
i
X  is given by 
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KTFX 

)(
1  
 We are considering that fixed rate payments and floating-rate payments occur 
at the same payment dates and with the same day-count conventions, and ignoring 
the swap funding spread. Though the generalization to different payment dates, day-
count conventions and swap funding spreads is straight-forward, we prefer to 
present a simplified version to ease the notation. 
 
Risk-Free IRS Valuation 
The discounted payoff of the IRS is 
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where ),( iTtD  is the discount factor. In general, bond price is deterministic but 
discount factor is stochastic. If interest rates are deterministic, the bond price 
),(
i
TtP  and the discount factor ),( iTtD  are equivalent. However, if interest rates are 
stochastic, they are different. In fact, the bond price can be viewed as the 
expectation of the discount factor.  
The pricing of the IRS can be obtained by considering the risk-neutral 
expectation E of its discounted payoff: 
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Where EEt : {.|F t } is the expectation conditional on the F t ; 
i
t
E  is the expectation 
under forward measure iQ  conditional on the F t . 
 The swap rate is the fixed rate that makes the market value of a given swap 
at initiation zero. The risk free swap rate is given by 
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Asymmetric Defaultable IRS Valuation 
There are two approaches to price defaultable financial instruments: 
Structural Approach and Reduced-Form Approach. The structural approach regards 
default as an endogenous event by focusing on the capital structure of the firm. 
Rendleman (1992) applies the structural model based on knowledge of the asset-
liability structure of the swap counterparties to the swaps market. The development 
of a structural model seems impractical given the data on generic market swap 
rates.  
The reduced-form approach proposed by Duffie and Singleton (1999), and 
Jarrow and Turnbell (1994) did not explain the event of default endogenously, but 
characterized it exogenously by a jump process.  
For the case of IRS’s, modeling the default time as an inaccessible stopping 
time, such as a Poisson arrival, seems reasonable because default events, when they 
do occurs, are rarely fully anticipated even a short time before the default. 
The stopping (default) time of party j (j = A, B) is modeled as a Poisson 
arrival with probability density function: 
 ))(exp()()( tththtf jjj       (11) 
where )(th j  is the hazard rate or the arrival intensity of a Poisson process whose 
first jump occurs at default. The stopping time for the IRS is defined as BA   . 
It is well-known that the survival probability from t to T in this framework is given by 
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We follow the common market practice and use a deterministic intensity 
model for hazard rate. The intensity function can be stripped by market prices of 
credit derivatives actively traded in the market, such as, Credit Default Swap (CDS). 
In some previous studies, such as Duffie and Huang (1996), the bond spreads 
are used to determine credit quality. Both bond spreads and CDS spreads are closely 
related to each other. Conceptually a CDS spread is different from a bond spread and 
that they can differ in magnitude for technical reason. There is some empirical 
evidence that the CDS market typically leads the bond market, in particular during 
crisis situation. Liquidity in the bond market is typically drying up during a financial 
crisis. Demand for insurance against default risk, on the other hand, increases if the 
issuer is experiencing financial stress. Consequently, prices and spreads derived from 
the CDS market tend to be more reliable during crises. Therefore, we use CDS 
spreads to calibrate hazard rates. We will generally refer to both as credit spreads 
unless otherwise noted. 
A critical ingredient of the pricing of a defaultable IRS is the rules for 
settlement in default. There are two rules in the swap market. The “one-way 
payment (fault)” rule was specified by the early International Swap Dealers 
Association (ISDA) master agreement. The non-defaulting party is not obligated to 
compensate the defaulting party if the remaining market value of the IRS is positive 
for the defaulting party. The “two-way payment (no fault)” rule is based on the 
current ISDA documentation. In the event of default, if the contract has positive 
value to the non-defaulting party, the defaulting party pays a fraction of the pre-
default market value of the IRS to the non-defaulting party. If the contract has 
positive value to the defaulting party, the non-defaulting party will pay the full pre-
default market value of the IRS to the defaulting party.  
Consider any swaplet i. According to Duffie and Huang (1996), we can get the 
discounted defaultable payoff as 
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where 
 )(1)(1)( 00 ususuR AXBX ii    
     )()(1)()(1)( uhuuhuus ABBBB    
     )()(1)()(1)( uhuuhuus BAAAA    
where Y  is an indicator function that is equal to one if Y is true and zero otherwise; 
j
  represents the fraction of the cash flow iX  paid by the defaulting counterparty j 
when the cash flow is negative for j. The recovery rate j  is normally considered as 
deterministic, although it can be time-varying. j  represents the fraction of the cash 
flow iX  paid by non-defaulting counterparty j when the cash flow is negative for j. 
j
 =0 represents the one-way settlement rule, while j =1 represents two-way 
settlement rule. jh  is the hazard rate of counterparty j. 
The default-adjusted spreads Bs  and As  in (12) have general forms that 
apply in several particular situations. Under the one-way settlement rule, we have  
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Under the two-way settlement rule, we have 
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Equation (12) can be rewritten as 
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default intensity model and a deterministic recovery assumption. 
An IRS is a linear product. The total discounted defaultable payoff of the IRS 
is just the sum of the discounted defaultable payoffs of the future swaplets, that is, 
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 The price of the defaultable IRS can be obtained by considering the risk-
neutral expectation E of its discounted defaultable payoff: 
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 The key to value an asymmetric defaultable IRS is to calculate the 
expectations:  01 iXi
i
t
XE  and  01 iXi
i
t
XE .  
According to (3), we can calculate 
    
 )()()(
2
exp
2
1
2
)(
exp)(
1)(1
21
2
1
1
2
0)(10
2
1
iiii
d
ii
ii
ii
KTFiii
i
tXi
i
t
dKdtF
dx
x
KxtT
tT
tF
KTFEXE
i
iii




























 






   (16) 
where x  is a standard normal variable;   is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function; 
 
tT
tTKtF
d
ii
iii
ii




 2/)(/)(ln 2
2,1 . Equation (16) is a standard 
Black formula on a call option. 
 Similarly, we have 
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This is a standard Black formula on a put option. 
 Therefore, the value of a defaultable swaplet is a risk-adjusted call option 
minus a risk-adjusted put option. In other words, a defaultable swaplet can be 
replicated by buying a risk-adjusted call option and selling a risk-adjusted put option, 
that is:  
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 The price of the defaultable IRS is  
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If both parties have the same credit quality (symmetric credit risk) and follow 
two-way settlement rule, i.e.,  
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equation (19) can be expressed as 
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where 1)()(  xx .  
This is exactly the formula of Duffie and Singleton (1997). The defaultable 
swap rate (K) under asymmetric credit risk can only be solved numerically, because 
K is also contained in 1id  and 2id . However, the analytic solution exists for the 
defaultable swap rate under symmetric credit risk. The symmetric defaultable swap 
rate that makes the market value of the IRS at initiation zero is 
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Bilateral CVA 
CVA offers an opportunity for banks to move beyond the traditional control 
mindset of credit risk limits by dynamically pricing counterparty credit risk directly 
into new trades. A trend that has become increasingly relevant and popular has been 
to consider the bilateral nature of counterparty credit risk. Most institutions view 
bilateral considerations as important in order to agree on new transactions. The 
bilateral CVA of an IRS, by definition, is the difference between the risk-free IRS 
value and the bilateral defaultable IRS value, given by 
)()()( tpvtpvtCVA DFree       (22) 
 Unlike the unilateral CVA that is always positive, the bilateral CVA can be 
positive or negative. Since the swaps market is a zero-sum game, for every winner 
there is an equal and opposite loser. 
 
4. Impact of Credit Risk 
We use a new 10-year IRS (provided by FinPricing (2019)) as an example. At 
the time the contract is entered into, there is no advantage to either party. Thus, the 
risk free value of the IRS is zero, i.e., 0)( tpv
Free
. The risk free swap rate calculated 
according to (10) is 2.59%. The 10-year treasury yield is 2.58%. The risk-free swap 
spread is 1 basis point. Swap spread is defined as the spread paid by the fixed-rate 
payer of an IRS over the rate of the on-the-run treasury with the same maturity as 
the IRS. The swap spread is the additional amount an investor would earn on an IRS 
as compared to a risk-free fixed rate investment. We report the empirical results in 
several cases. 
 
LIBOR Party Paying Floating-Rate 
LIBOR reflects an average of the borrowing costs for large banks with AA 
credit rating. A hypothetical LIBOR quality entity can issue floating bonds at LIBOR 
flat, i.e., with par coupon being the same as LIBOR. But an entity with lower credit 
quality than LIBOR can only issue bonds at LIBOR plus positive spreads so as to 
compensate the bondholders for the credit risk that they undertake. These credit 
spreads are the credit funding cost for this entity. The swap funding spread (floating-
rate spread) is different from the credit spread but is of the same origin. We assume 
that a LIBOR floating payer enter a par swap with zero swap funding spread.  
Let the floating-rate payer have the same credit quality as LIBOR and the 
second party have a parallel shifted spread against the LIBOR party. Assume that the 
second party has a constant recovery rate 60%. The hazard rates are bootstrapped 
from CDS spreads. The defaultable IRS values, CVA’s, swap rates and swap spreads, 
from the perspective of counterparty A, are calculated according to the description of 
section 3 and shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Credit quality impact (the floating-rate payer is a LIBOR party; the swap funding 
spread is 0; swap spread change = defaultable swap spread – default-free swap 
spread) 
Rating Defaultable 
IRS value 
CVA 
Defaultable 
swap rate 
Swap spread 
change party A party B 
AA+100bp AA 147.4069 -147.4069 2.6061% 1.6bp 
AA+200bp AA 286.5230 -286.5230 2.6222% 3.2bp 
AA+300bp AA 420.9761 -420.9761 2.6383% 4.8bp 
 
From table 1, we find that a credit spread of about 100 basis points translates 
into a swap spread of about 1.6 basis points. The credit impact on swap rates is 
approximately linear within the range of normally encountered credit quality. This 
confirms the findings of Duffie and Huang (1996). 
The magnitude of the difference between the credit spread and swap spread 
can by explained by the exposure and the credit risk. In the case of a bond, all 
coupons and the principal are at risk. In the case of an IRS, only net cashflows are at 
risk. The impact of net cashflows is much smaller than that of all cashflows plus 
principal. 
 
Both Parties Having Spreads against the LIBOR 
Now we are considering the cases that both parties have credit spreads 
against the LIBRO. If the party who pays the floating-rate has a credit quality 
different from the LIBOR, a swap funding spread is also needed to be introduced. 
This funding spread actually reflects the different funding cost of different issuers 
and also has an impact on swap rate. To simplify the analysis, we fix the swap 
funding spread and assume the floating-rate payer has 100 basis points against the 
LIBOR. The results are shown in Table 2 and table 3. We show that the swap funding 
spread has a significant impact on swap spread as well. If we fix the swap funding 
spread, the swap spreads increase as the credit spreads of the two parties increase. 
But the impact is not linear any more. 
 
Table 2 
Credit quality impact (both parties are not a LIBOR party; the swap funding spread is 
0.1%; swap spread change = defaultable swap spread – default-free swap spread) 
Rating Defaultable 
IRS value 
CVA 
Defaultable 
swap rate 
Swap spread 
change party A party B 
AA+100bp AA+100bp 220.1629 -220.1629 2.6148% 2.4bp 
AA+200bp AA+100bp 286.5230 -286.5230 2.6309% 4.1bp 
AA+300bp AA+100bp 420.9761 -420.9761 2.6469% 5.7bp 
 
Table 3 
Credit quality impact (both parties are not a LIBOR party; the swap funding spread is 
0.12%; swap spread change = defaultable swap spread – default-free swap spread) 
Rating Defaultable 
IRS value 
CVA 
Defaultable 
swap rate 
Swap spread 
change party A party B 
AA+100bp AA+100bp 394.4319 -394.4319 2.6347% 4.5bp 
AA+200bp AA+100bp 527.6796 -527.6796 2.6510% 6.1bp 
AA+300bp AA+100bp 656.4207 -656.4207 2.6670% 7.8bp 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we present an analytical model for pricing defaultable IRS’s with 
asymmetric credit qualities. The model is based on the market models of interest 
rate dynamics and the reduced-form model of default time. 
The object modeled under the market models is market-observable. It is also 
consistent with the market standard approach for pricing caps/floors using Black’s 
formula. The market models have now become some of the most popular models for 
pricing such derivatives. They are generally considered to have more desirable 
theoretical calibration properties than short rate or instantaneous forward rate 
models. 
 Unlike structural models, reduced-form models do not condition default 
explicitly on the value of the firm, and parameters related to the firm’s value need 
not be estimated to implement the model. For pricing and hedging, reduced-form 
models are the preferred methodology. 
 Our closed-form solution shows that the value of a bilateral defaultable IRS is 
the sum of the values of individual bilateral defaultable swaplets. Each bilateral 
defaultable swaplet can be replicated by buying a risk-adjusted call option and selling 
a risk-adjusted put option. The risk-adjusting factors depend on hazard rates, 
recovery rates and settlement rules. 
 In the case where the floating-rate payer is a LIBOR party, we confirm 
findings in Duffie and Huang (1996) that the swap spreads are relatively less 
sensitive to credit quality comparing to the bond spreads or the CDS spreads. The 
credit impact on swap rates is approximately linear. In the case where both parties 
have spreads against the LIBOR that was not studied closely before, we find that the 
credit impact on swap rates is not linear any more. The swap funding spreads have a 
significantly impact on swap spreads as well. 
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